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In order to promote public understanding of the impact of regulations on 
consumers, business, and government, the American Enterprise Institute and the 
Brookings Institution established the AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory 
Studies.  The Joint Center’s primary purpose is to hold lawmakers and regulators 
more accountable by providing thoughtful, objective analysis of relevant laws and 
regulations. Over the past three decades, AEI and Brookings have generated an 
impressive body of research on regulation. The Joint Center builds on this solid 
foundation, evaluating the economic impact of laws and regulations and offering 
constructive suggestions for reforms to enhance productivity and welfare. The 
views expressed in Joint Center publications are those of the authors and do not 
necessarily reflect the views of the Joint Center. 
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One mechanism that scholars have suggested for improving the quality of regulatory 
analysis is to increase the use of peer review. This analysis addresses some of the particular peer 
review procedures discussed in “OMB's Proposed Bulletin on Peer Review and Information 
Quality.” In general, we think that the OMB bulletin makes some good points, but we also think 
peer review is not without its problems as a method for improving regulatory analysis. 
 
We recommend that OMB develop a method for evaluating the effectiveness of efforts to 
implement this new peer review initiative. If, in cooperation with the regulatory agencies, it 
cannot develop a reasonable approach to evaluation, we recommend that it probably should not 
proceed with this effort. Finally, we suggest that a congressional office of regulatory assessment 
is more likely to improve regulatory analysis than the introduction of the kind of peer review 
contemplated here.   1
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One of the goals of regulatory analysis is to help improve the quality of 
regulation. A second is to help make the regulatory process more transparent. In order to 
help achieve these goals, the regulatory analysis should meet certain quality standards.  
Over the years scholars and practitioners have suggested several ways of 
improving the quality of regulatory analysis.
1 One mechanism that has achieved some 
attention is to introduce peer review. We think peer review has some potential to improve 
regulatory analysis, but it also could actually make things worse if not designed properly.  
Suppose, for example, that some regulatory agencies have a form of “tunnel 
vision,” which means they do not consider the broader implications of their policy.
2 If the 
same agency selects the peer reviewers, then this could be a problem, because the 
reviewers may simply serve to rubber stamp an agency’s views. In addition, peer review 
could give that agency an aura of objectivity, making it more likely that individual 
regulations would be promulgated that are ineffective or inefficient. We discuss below 
how to avoid this outcome. 
This analysis addresses some of the particular peer review procedures discussed 
in “OMB's Proposed Bulletin on Peer Review and Information Quality.” In general, we 
think that the OMB bulletin makes some good points, but we also think peer review is not 




  OMB begins by noting that “[e]xisting agency peer review mechanisms have not 
always been sufficient to ensure the reliability of regulatory information disseminated or 
                                                 
1 See Graham and Wiener (1995); Hahn and Sunstein (2002). 
2 See Breyer (1993).   2
relied upon by federal agencies.”
3 Peer review is only one of several factors that affect 
the reliability and quality of information. Another important factor, for example, has been 
the reluctance of OMB to enforce its guidelines effectively.
4 
OMB appears to believe that peer review is a good thing, citing many 
authoritative sources on the need for peer review. For example, the OMB bulletin quotes 
the testimony of former OIRA Administrator Sally Katzen. She states that scientific 
inferences “should pass muster under peer review by those in the same discipline, who 
should have an opportunity for such review to ensure that underlying work was done 
competently and that any assumptions made are reasonable.” While we generally agree, 
we think that the actual impact of peer review on the economic analysis of regulations is 
an open question that should be investigated. 
As is widely recognized in academic work, peer review is not a panacea. One 
study, published in the Journal of the American Medical Association, asked a number of 
people to conduct a peer review of a paper with deliberate errors included. The resulting 
peer reviews were ineffective. Experts caught a disturbingly low number of the 
intentional errors.
5 Thus, one should not assume that peer reviews conducted by the 
government will produce beneficial results. 
 
Recommendation 1: OMB, or some other agency, such as GAO, should 
conduct an evaluation of the peer review program after a certain amount of 
time, say three years, to determine whether peer review actually led to a 
marked improvement in the quality of the regulatory analyses. 
 
A basic question is whether peer review will have any substantive impact on the 
quality of Regulatory Impact Analyses (RIAs).
6 An RIA is a study conducted by an 
agency that identifies the need for a regulation, examines alternative approaches, assesses 
benefits and costs, provides reasons for choosing the regulatory action, and states the 
                                                 
3 OMB (2003): 68 FR 54024. 
4 See Hahn et al. (2000).  See also OMB Information Quality Guidelines (2002).  
5 See Godlee et al. (1998), at 2. The study gave 420 people a paper with eight deliberate errors for review. 
For the 221 reviewers who responded, the maximum number of errors detected was five, the median was 
two, and 16 percent of the respondents did not find any. 
6 A related and more difficult issue is whether peer review has a more general impact on specific 
documents used in the regulatory review process.   3
statutory authority.
7  However, research reveals that not all RIAs are created equal.
8 
Implementing peer reviews of RIAs is intended to increase the reliability and consistency 
of agency cost and benefit estimates. 
We can think of at least two experimental designs for assessing the impact of peer 
review on RIAs. One is to compare the quality of RIAs before and after the introduction 
of peer review. A second is to compare RIAs that are peer reviewed with those that are 
not at the same point in time. A key issue is how to measure quality. One can use 
reasonably objective measures that are relatively easy to assess, but may miss important 
dimensions of quality; alternatively, one can use more subjective measures that are harder 
to assess and may be more likely to vary across reviewers.
9 A second problem in 
assessing the effectiveness of peer review is that many other factors are likely to be 
changing simultaneously. Suppose, for example, OMB began enforcing its recent 
guidance for conducting RIAs more vigorously at the same time.
10 Then, it would be 
harder to disentangle cause and effect. 
We would suggest that OMB give the evaluation issue further thought before it 
proceeds with its efforts to implement peer review. If, in cooperation with the regulatory 
agencies, it cannot develop a reasonable approach to evaluation, it probably should not 
proceed with this effort. 
OMB has designed its peer review mechanism so that the agency can choose its 
peer reviewers and outline a plan to review its own study, subject to broad constraints. 
We think this is a mistake.  
 
Recommendation 2: Peer reviewers should be selected by a neutral, 
respected outside body. One possibility would be to have the NAS select 
such reviewers. Alternatively, respected agencies in the Executive, such as 
OIRA, CEA or OSTP could be charged with devising a suitable selection 
mechanism and possibly making choices.
11 
 
                                                 
7 See Executive Order 12866 (1993). 
8 See Morgenstern (1997). 
9 See Hahn et al. (2000) and Morgenstern (1997). 
10 See OMB (2003b), at Appendix D for OMB’s guidance to Federal agencies on the development of 
regulatory analysis.  
11 For a similar recommendation see Lutter (2003), at 9.   4
  The OMB is worried about conflicts of interest of the peer reviewers. We think 
such concerns are warranted, but that the choice of peer reviewers should be based more 
on the expertise of the reviewer and his or her reputation in a field. Moreover, OMB 
should recognize that there are inherent trade-offs between expertise and having actual or 
perceived conflicts of interest. 
 
Recommendation 3: In selecting peer reviewers, more weight should be 
given to actual expertise and reputation in a field than perceived conflicts 
of interest. Actual conflicts of interest should be considered, but it should 
be recognized that virtually all reviewers will have some potential 
conflicts.
12   
 
  Note that Recommendation 3 may conflict with Recommendation 2 in the sense 
that the agencies charged with writing regulations are likely to have specialized 
knowledge that would be useful in selecting peer reviewers. However, one can address 
this issue by allowing agencies to help inform the process without being given the 
authority to select particular reviewers. 
  Another problem that OMB should consider is the incentive to do a first-rate peer 
review. OMB basically is silent about the economic incentives facing peer reviewers 
outside of conflicts of interest. We are concerned about providing incentives to peer 
reviewers to do a good job on the review. We think it is unlikely that reviewers will do 
much to improve the quality of regulatory analysis unless they are given adequate 
incentives to do so. 
 
Recommendation 4: OMB should explore ways to compensate reviewers 
for something closer to the full value of their time. We recognize this is 
difficult in government, but the alternative of paying relatively low wages 




  OMB lets the agencies write the peer review policies in consultation with OMB 
and OSTP. We think this is a mistake. In our view, there is no reason why one peer 
                                                 
12 See Hahn (2002). 
13 Simply paying a high wage is not sufficient if the reviewer does not do a good job. Unfortunately, it may 
be difficult to measure the quality of the peer review.   5
review document cannot pertain to all of the regulatory agencies. Admittedly, there are 
some differences across agencies and regulations, but this can easily be accommodated in 
the policy. 
 
Recommendation 5: OMB should develop the peer review policy for all 
agencies after consulting with the affected agencies, CEA, and OSTP. If 
that is not possible, CEA should be added to list of agencies that should be 
consulted. 
 
  In addition, we would also add a couple of points made by our former Joint 
Center colleague Randall Lutter, who is now chief economist at the Food and Drug 
Administration. First, peer review efforts should be conducted in a timely manner, so 
they are useful inputs in the policy process. Second, where reviewers desire it, they 




We can think of many ways to improve the quality of regulatory analysis. While 
peer review may be helpful, it is by no means clear that it will be. Indeed, we are struck 
by the fact that it has failed to reliably detect errors in an academic setting.
14  There is no 
reason to think that it will work much better in government. 
  If OMB decides to go ahead with its peer review initiative, all regulations should 
not be treated in the same manner. The reason is that the quality of regulatory analysis 
varies across regulations. If OMB could use some of its own expertise along with agency 
expertise at the proposed rule stage to identify analyses that are problematic, then it could 
target resources more effectively to improve analyses that are especially bad. 
  As an alternative to peer review, we think that Congress should consider initiating 
a Congressional Office of Regulatory Analysis. The purpose of this independent office 
would be to review the proposed and finalized RIAs and rules drafted by federal 
regulatory agencies. Compared to the OMB, which is a part of the same administration as 
the head of each agency, a regulatory oversight office outside of the executive branch 
                                                 
14 See discussion above on Godlee et al. (1998).    6
would have fewer political constraints, and therefore be able to more easily criticize the 
analysis done by federal agencies. Additionally, the congressional office would help to 
increase transparency in government regulation to the public, and Congress could use the 
independent analysis to help improve regulation and the regulatory process.
15 We think 
such an office is more likely to improve regulatory analysis than the introduction of the 
kind of peer review contemplated here.
16 
                                                 
15 For a more in-depth argument for a Congressional Office of Regulatory Analysis, see Hahn and Litan 
(2003), at 10-13. 
16 The two policy options are not mutually exclusive.                                                                          7  
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